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Abstract— In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), security has a 
vital importance. Recently, there was a huge interest to propose 
security solutions in WSNs because of their applications in both 
civilian and military domains. Adversaries can launch different 
types of attacks, and cryptography is used to countering these 
attacks. In this paper, we present challenges of security, and 
classification of the different possible attacks in WSNs. The 
problems of security in each layer of the network's OSI model 
are discussed.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rapid development in technologies realizations of 
electronic components, and in particular, of microprocessors, 
make possible to develop equipment with low cost and low 
power, of size and weights increasingly reduced. WSNs are a 
particular type of ad hoc networks, comprised mainly of large 
number (hundred or thousand) deployed sensor nodes with 
limited resources and one or more base stations (BSs) or sink 
(Figure 1), typically serves as the access point for the user or as 
a gateway to another network. Nodes can collect and transmit 
(with wireless links) environmental data (temperature, 
pressure, humidity, noise levels, etc) in autonomous manner. 
The node in WSN plays tow roles: collect data and route data 
back to the base station.  
 
Figure 1.  A WSN. 
Typically, sensor node consists of five components, as 
shown in figure 2: power unit (battery), memory, 
transmitter/receiver, embedded processor, and sensing unit. 
Additional components can be implanted in a sensor node: 
location finding system: allow the node to find its position, a 
power generator: used for recharging battery node and prolong 
its lifetime, and a mobilizer: make nodes move [8]. Sensing 
units are usually composed of two subunits: sensor and analog-
to-digital converter (ADC). When an event was produced 
(analog data) node sense analog signal observed convert it to 
digital signals by the ADC unit, and then treat it with the 
processing unit. A transceiver unit connects the node to the 
network. One of the most important components of a sensor 
node is the power unit (battery); it is the fuel of the node. For 
detailed stat of the art see [8, 15]. 
For example, SmartDust node have only 8 bit processor, an 
8 KB instruction flash memory, and a bandwidth of 10 Kbps 
(Kilo bit per second) [12].  
   
 
Figure 2.  Sensor node [8]. 
As much of technology, the development of WSNs was 
caused by military needs. Indeed, the armies discreetly wish to 
be in measurement of espionner their enemies. SOSUS (the 
SOund SUrveillance System) used during the cold war to 
detect Soviet submarines [13, 14], other applications are: 
environmental monitoring, health monitoring of patients, 
habitat monitoring, disaster recovery, smart environment. 
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Sensor nodes are deployed in hostile and inaccessible area 
(e.g. military use to enemy surveillance), and it is impossible 
(in general) to know the position of the node after deployment, 
so nodes can be physically captured or destroyed by attackers. 
Provide security is a very important problem in WSNs.  
Traditional security techniques used in traditional networks 
can not be applied directly, because of extremely constrained 
resources like energy, bandwidth and capabilities of processing 
and storing data of nodes in WSNs. The tiny hardware of 
sensor node is not capable of performing complex security 
protocols, so security should be reconsidered and new ideas in 
security researches are needed. 
In this paper, we aim to give an overview of security 
problem in WSNs, present different attacks, and classify these 
attacks in the OSI model.  The reminder of this paper is 
organized as follows: in section 2, OSI model of these 
networks is briefly presented. Sections 3-6 discuss constraints 
and limitation of sensor nodes and security goals. Sections 7-9 
give definitions of attacks, attackers, and impact of attacks 
toward each layer of OSI model. Finally, we conclude in 
section 10. 
II. THE OSI MODEL 
The role of this model (Opening System Interconnect) 
consists in standardizing the communication between the 
participants so that various manufacturers can develop 
compatible products (software or hardware).  
 
 
Figure 3.  OSI model in WSNs. 
Each layer of the model communicates with an adjacent 
layer (that of the top or that of the lower part). Each layer uses 
the services of the sub-bases and provides some to that of 
higher level. 
III. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
The physical vulnerability is the fact that sensors are 
scattered in insecure place like public places, the natural 
environments (mountainous region) as well as   the buildings, 
smart houses and museums (smart environment), so attacker 
have the physical access to the node, and with appropriate 
tools, he can read the secret information (like keys,  programs,  
etc) stored in the node memory.  
Other vulnerability is related to wireless technology. Unlike 
the traditional wired networks, the attackers could easily 
capture the data packet because the data transmissions are all in 
the air. Whoever having the adequate receiver can potentially 
listen to or disturb the exchanged messages. 
Sensor nodes are themselves routers. Packets pass through 
different nodes in multi-hops routes to arrive at their 
destination. Due to the possible of violation of such nodes, this 
feature presents a serious vulnerability.  
Sensor nodes are prone to failure, witch make topology 
dynamic. Dynamic network topology can be caused also by the 
mobility of nodes and addition of new nodes.   
IV. CONSTRAINTS INFLUENCING ON SECURITY IN WSNS   
Constraints that make traditional security impractical in 
WSNs are:  
Low energy power: The energy of the nodes is limited 
(limited battery lifetime), and generally irreplaceable and no-
recharging battery. Protocols of WSNs must concentrate 
mainly on the conservation of energy.    
Limited memory and computation capacity: In the majority 
of WSNs, nodes are not able to memorize keys of significant 
size, or to carry out complex protocols cryptographic [1].  
Therefore, new security measures are needed to address 
constraints of WSNs.  
V. ENERGY FOR SECURITY 
Lifetime node is generally limited by the lifetime of a tiny 
battery, so energy is the fundamental resource constraint. The 
additional power consumed by nodes of sensor due to security 
is dependent on:  
• Calculation necessary for the functions of security, 
such as ciphering, deciphering, verification of the 
signature.  
• Energy necessary for the transmission and 
management of security material (keys, etc). 
• Energy necessary for the storage of the keys. 
The challenge is to minimize the consumption of the energy 
with maximizing the performances of security. 
Energy is an important factor to consider when designing 
security measures for WSNs. Conserving node energy to 
extend his lifetime, and prolong network functionalities.  
VI. SECURITY GOALS 
Sensor networks with limited processing power, storage, 
bandwidth, and energy require special security approaches. The 
hardware and energy constraints of the sensors add difficulty to 
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the security requirements of ad hoc networks concerning 
availability, integrity, confidentiality, freshness, authentication, 
access control, and non-repudiation [2]. 
Availability: the availability gives insurance over the 
reactivity and time of response of the system to transmit 
information of one source to the good destination.  It also 
means that the services of network are available to the 
authorized parts if necessary and ensures the services of 
network in spite of denies of service attack (DoS).  
Integrity: it is a service which guarantees that data are not 
be modified during the transmission. Integrity protects the 
network against the injection or the modification of messages. 
Confidentiality: is the guarantee that the information of a 
node is not available or revealed only with its recipient. 
Freshness: WSNs provide some measurements in time; we 
must ensure that each message is fresh. The freshness of data 
implies that the data are recent, and it ensures that no adversary 
replay the old messages. 
Authentication: an adversary is not simply limited to 
modify the message. He can inject additional messages. Thus 
the receiver must make sure that the data used come from the 
correct source. In addition, by constructing WSNs, the 
authentication is necessary for many tasks.   
Access control: gives to the legitimate participants a means 
to detect the messages coming from external sources of the 
network. 
Non-repudiation: ensures that the origin of a message 
cannot deny having sent the message [2]. 
VII. ATTACKS IN WSNS 
A variety of attacks against WSNs is documented in the 
literature. To face these attacks, various against measurements 
were proposed. We present in the continuation the principal 
types of attacks, and in section 9 we assign these attacks to the 
layers concerned of the OSI model.        
A classification of the attacks consists in distinguishing the 
passive attacks from the active attacks. 
The passive attack (eavesdropping) is limited to listening 
and analyzes exchanged traffic. This type of attacks is easier to 
realize (it is enough to have the adequate receiver), and it is 
difficult to detect. Since, the attacker does not make any 
modification on exchanged information. The intention of the 
attacker can be the knowledge of confidential information or 
the knowledge of the significant nodes in the network (cluster 
head node), by analyzing routing information, to prepare an 
active attack. 
In the active attacks, an attacker tries to remove or modify 
the messages transmitted on the network. He can also inject his 
own traffic or replay of old messages to disturb the operation of 
the network or to cause a denial of service. Among the most 
known active attacks, we can quote: 
Tampering: it is the result of physical access to the node by 
an attacker; the purpose will be to recover cryptographic 
material like the keys used for ciphering [3]. 
Black hole: a node falsifies routing information to force the 
passage of the data by itself, later on; its only mission is then, 
nothing to transfer, creating a sink or black hole in the network 
[1]. 
Selective forwarding: as mentioned above, a node play the 
role of router, in a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes 
may refuse to forward certain messages and simply drop them.  
Sybil attack: Newsome et al. [5] definite this attack by: 
"malevolent device, taking multiple identities in an illegitimate 
way", attacker can use the identities of the others nodes in 
order to take part in distributed algorithms such as the election. 
HELLO flood attack: many routing protocols use 
"HELLO" packet to discover neighboring nodes and thus to 
establish a topology of the network. The simplest attack for an 
attacker consists in sending a flood of such messages to flood 
the network and to prevent other messages from being 
exchanged. 
Jamming: a well-known attack on wireless communication, 
it consists in disturbing the radio channel by sending useless 
information on the frequency band used. This jamming can be 
temporary, intermittent or permanent [6].  
Blackmail attack: a malicious node makes announce that 
another legitimate node is malicious to eliminate this last from 
the network. If the malicious node manages to tackle a 
significant number of nodes, it will be able to disturb the 
operation of the network. 
Exhaustion: is to consume all the resources energy of the 
victim node, by obliging it to do calculations or to receive or 
transmit unnecessarily data [7]. 
Wormhole attack: attackers here are strategically placed at 
different ends of a network. They can receive messages and 
replays them in different parts by means of a tunnel [9].  
Identity replication attack: attacker can clone nodes, and 
place it in different part of the network in order to collect 
majority of information traffic.  Unlike the Sybil attack, the 
identity replication attack [10] is based upon giving the same 
identity to different physical nods. This attack can be mounted 
because in a WSN there is no way to know that a wireless 
sensor node is compromised.      
VIII. ATTACKER MODEL 
The goal of an attacker (adversary) is to illegally obtain 
keys stored in nodes by vulnerabilities exploitation.   
Strong attacker: The adversary is considered as present 
before and after deployment of nodes. It can supervise all the 
communications, anywhere, and at any moment. 
A realistic attacker model: The attacker is able to supervise 
a fixed percentage of communication channels after 
deployment [4].  
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"The hostile surveillance is not ubiquitous during the 
deployment phase of the network and only fraction of the 
established link keys can be obtained by the attacker" [4]. 
IX. PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN EACH LAYER 
In this section, we provide a layer based classification of 
defined attacks on the OSI model described above.   
A. Physical layer 
Deal with the specification of the frequencies bands. This 
layer must ensure of the techniques of emission, reception and 
modulation of data in a robust way. 
The attacks associated in the physical layer are very few 
but, at the same time, can be most difficult to prevent: jamming 
on the same frequency that the network uses, and the physical 
attack of a node. 
One standard defence against jamming employs spread-
spectrum communication [7]. Node capture is the more 
upsetting problem in the security of WSNs. The use of resistant 
hardware against capture attack (tamperproof node) can solve 
this problem, but increase the node cost.  
In figure 5, we use MATLAB software (MATLAB is an 
abbreviation of MATrix LABoratory. MATLAB is an 
interactive matrix-based system for scientific and engineering 
calculations) to simulate a random deployment of 100 sensor 
nodes in 100m x 100m area (figure 4), and then we randomly 
compromise sensor nodes to evaluate the effect of 
compromised links. 
Whenever the number of neighbors of the compromised 
sensor node is high, the great is the effect of compromised this 
sensor node.  
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Figure 4.   A WSN with 100 sensor nodes. 
 
Figure 5.  Percentage of compromised links versus number of compromised 
sensor nodes. 
B. MAC layer 
This layer manages the access to the radio channel (MAC 
layer), and control errors. The adversary can only induce 
collision in a one byte of a transmission to disturb the entire 
data packet. So obligate the victim node to retransmit the data 
packet and cause a death of this node by consuming its energy 
(exhaustion attack).  
The prevention of these attacks can be limited to impose the 
use of small packets, use techniques of correction to ask for the 
retransmission of packet. 
C. Network layer 
WSNs use a communication multi-hops for routing the 
packets towards the destination, the attacks in this layer are: 
black hole, selective forwarding, Sybil attack, HELLO flood 
attack, wormhole, and Identity replication attack. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Routing layer attacks in WSNs. 
The prevention of this kind of attacks invites to authenticate 
all messages. In a hierarchical network of sensors, the parents’ 
nodes can check the identity of the source of a packet in transit. 
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Monitoring is a strategy to make safe the routing and to 
detect the abnormal behaviors of the nodes [11]. In this 
approach, the nodes act as "a watchdogs" to supervise the next 
transmission of the packet. If the misbehaviour would be 
detected, the nodes will update the information of routing to 
avoid the compromised node. 
Probing is another proactive defense against the malevolent 
nodes in WSNs [11]. This method periodically sends packets of 
probing through the network to detect areas of breakdown. 
Since the geographical protocols of routing have the 
knowledge of the topology of the network, probing is 
particularly well adapted to their use. The probing packets must 
seem to be the normal traffic, in order to detect the 
compromised nodes. 
Redundancy another approach suggested in [11] consists in 
sending the package several times on different paths; at least a 
path delivers the packet to the destination. It is clear that this 
method does not preserve energy but it increases the difficulty 
for an attacker of stopping the traffic. 
X. DISCUSSION  
Securing WSNs is a subject of active work. There are three 
issues to underwrite security in WSNs; (i) key management: to 
use encryption, the parties involved have to hold the right 
cryptographic keys. Key management schemes are essentials 
for every system to provide confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and the other security goals [16]. It is the 
technique of establishment and maintenance of keys between 
legitimate nodes, and allows the updating, revocation and 
destruction of keys. Due to the resource limitation, providing 
efficient key management in WSNs is a challenge. (ii) Securing 
routing is the next issue to address. There are two kinds of 
threats to the routing protocols: external attackers, 
compromised interns’ nodes, which are very difficult to detect 
because the compromised node can generate valid packets. 
Existents routing protocols for WSNs offer little or no security 
features [1]. (iii) Prevention of denial-of-service is the third 
issue, DoS can be defined as any event which decreases or 
eliminates the capacity of the network to carry out the 
functions envisaged. Breakdowns of hardware, programming 
errors, exhaustion of resource, environmental conditions, or 
any complicated interaction between these factors can cause 
DoS. DoS attacks prevent or reduce the use of computer or 
resources, interrupt or delay services, making network become 
unavailable, isolate legitimate users from a network. 
XI. CONCLUSION  
Now, popularity of WSNs increases, and takes attention of 
many researchers. This paper treats security challenges in 
WSNs, which differ from the ad hoc networks with more 
severe restrictions in terms of energy, computation capabilities 
and communications. Consequently, the solutions of security 
must thus be adapted.   
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